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Gendering the President Male: Executive Authority
Beyond Rule-of-Law Constitutionalism in the American
Context
1

Larry Catá Backer

Abstract: Law, like other methods of disciplining behavior, has a gender dimension. Consciously or not, male elites in the United States, like
those in other nations, continue to protect the male gender borderlands of
behavior norms in ways that affirm for those behaviors a privileged role of
the standard by which male and female conduct is judged. And there is no
more powerful set of behavior norms than law, and especially constitutional
law, in the United States. This essay considers the gender hierarchy and
behavior presumptions just under the surface of Harvey Mansfield’s recent
suggestion that rule of law constitutionalism ought to be limited to the legislative an judicial branches, which are meant to be cooperative and nurturing institutions, but that the President’s Constitutional powers extend beyond the mere execution of the laws, and can include extra-legal acts.
“Thus it is wrong to accuse President Bush of acting illegally in the surveillance of possible enemies, as if that were a crime and legality is all that
matters.” After a short introduction, Part II starts with a discussion of the
relation between gender hierarchy and law. It sets out the parameters
within which gender analysis of institutional action and facially genderless
arguments can be understood as embracing gender assumptions of three
kinds—first a gender hierarchy in which the male is privileged over the
female, second a set of assumptions about those behaviors that are inherently female and those inherently male, and third, a behavior legitimating
reflex avoiding the legitimacy of males or male institutions assuming female behavior roles. This analysis provides the context for Part III, which
analyses Harvey Mansfield’s argument that the assertion of a power in the

1
Visiting Professor of Law, Tulane Law School, New Orleans, LA; Director, Coalition for Peace
and Ethics, Washington, D.C.; Professor of Law, Pennsylvania State University, State College, PA. An
earlier version of this essay was presented as part of a panel entitled “Masculinity, Maleness and the
Constitution,” at the 12th Annual LatCrit Conference, October 6, 2007. My thanks to Professor John
Kang for organizing the panel, to the participants at the presentation, whose questions and comments
were extremely insightful, and to my research assistant, Augusto Molna (Penn State ’09) for his excellent work on this project.
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president to act extra-legally is legitimate as a robust application of basic
principles of American constitutional law.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ideologies of gender, understood as a community’s articulated forms
2
of social self-consciousness, remain ascendant throughout the world.
These ideologies are imprinted in the law of all states—modern and ancient,
3
religious and secular. These ideologies become increasingly less visible as
societies substitute the language of corruption, psychosis and ethno-national
4
chauvinism for that of gender. The power of these ideologies to discipline
and subordinate women is well understood in the West, even among con5
servative jurists. Less well-understood is the way in which these ideologies discipline and subordinate women by defining, disciplining, and sub6
ordinating the “female” in men. Thus, intra-sex gendering, these malemale behavior-privileging norms, serve as the basis for structuring ideal
behavior norms for all members of society—whether sexed male or female,
7
and for the institutions that serve them.
This essay considers the subtleties and dynamics of male on male gendering on the construction of law in general, and on the Constitution of the
American government through its constitutional order in particular, in a
context in which direct regulation of sexual conduct has lost much of its
power, but in which the social power of sexual privileging and order re8
mains vitally strong. For that purpose, the essay will engage in a close
reading of a recent work of Harvey Mansfield, a member of the liberal arts
faculty at Harvard University. In an article recently published in the Ameri-

2
See generally Larry Catá Backer, Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States,
Zimbabwe and Malaysia, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2005).
3
See id. at 1.
4
See id. at 2.
5
See id. at 2-3.
6
For recent efforts to interrogate the subject, see generally MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN
AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY (1996); E. ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN MANHOOD:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN ERA (1993); MARK E.
KANN, ON THE MAN QUESTION: GENDER AND CIVIC VIRTUE IN AMERICA (1991).
7
See Backer, supra note 2, at 3. Female space, even within some feminist discourse, is shared
space—mother and child. That seems to be the thrust of some of the most compelling feminist scholarship that has sought to overturn the male centered dynamic of social gendering—to posit a standard that
is centered on the female. See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES 22-24 (1995) (positing a normative baseline in the
mother and child in which the male serves as the catch-all for ‘not-mother,’ and suggesting that a father
is a male who can conform his behavior to the ideal of ‘mother’).
8
See also Larry Catá Backer, Exposing the Perversions of Toleration: The Decriminalization of
Private Sexual Conduct, the Model Penal Code, and the Oxymoron of Liberal Toleration, 45 FLA. L.
REV. 755 (1993).
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9

can Standard, Harvey Mansfield seeks to apply a gendered, male oriented,
framework of social and political organization that he developed else10
where, to reorient foundational understandings of constitutional law principles. Professor Mansfield proposes a theory of “lawless” constitutionalism, that is of a constitutionally sanctioned power to act beyond the law, as
the basis for defending a substantial extension of Presidential power under
11
the American system of government. The essay will unpack the complex
ideological assumptions underlying a seemingly straightforward analysis
justifying a non-rule of law simple analysis.
The thesis of this essay is that Mansfield’s project—to convince the
reader that traditional rule-of-law constitutionalism emasculates the “true”
constitutional framework envisioned by the Founders—is grounded on a
series of ideologies of gender, in which rule-of-law governance is painted
as female—and appropriate to those branches of government gendered female (the legislative and judicial branches). Such governance norms are
inappropriate to that branch of government gendered male—the executive.
When rule of law is applied to frame presidential power, however, it remakes presidential power defectively male. A perversion occurs that can be
corrected only when presidential power is understood in its true light—as
the embodiment of a state power to act beyond law. The essay starts with a
discussion of the relation between gender hierarchy and law. It sets out the
parameters within which gender analysis of institutional action and facially
genderless arguments can be understood as embracing gender assumptions
of three kinds—first a gender hierarchy in which the male is privileged over
the female, second a set of assumptions about those behaviors that are inherently female and those inherently male, and third, a behavior legitimating reflex avoiding the legitimacy of males or male institutions assuming
female behavior roles. This summary provides the basis for the heart of the
essay in Part III, which analyses Harvey Mansfield’s argument that the constitution vests the president with a power act extra-legally, and that the
grant of such power is defensible through an application of conventional
constitutional principles.

9
Harvey C. Mansfield, The Law and the President: In a National Emergency, Who You Gonna
Call?, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Vol. 11, issue 17 (Jan. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/006/563mevpm.asp?pg=1 (accessed
October 23, 2008).
10 See generally HARVEY C. MANSFIELD, MANLINESS (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press,
2006).
11 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
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II. GENDER PRESUMPTIONS IN LAW
Ideologies of gender, understood as a community’s articulated forms
12
of social self-consciousness, remain ascendant throughout the world.
These ideologies are imprinted in the law of all states—modern and ancient,
13
religious and secular. These ideologies become increasingly less visible as
societies substitute the language of corruption, psychosis and ethno-national
14
chauvinism for that of gender. The power of these ideologies to discipline
and subordinate women is well understood in the West, even among con15
servative jurists. Feminists have been at the forefront of thinking through
issues of gender in law, a subject that remains largely ignored by others,
16
even within otherwise critical or progressive movements.
Less well-understood is the way in which these ideologies discipline
and subordinate women by defining, disciplining, and subordinating the
17
“female” in men. Thus, intra-sex gendering, these male-male behaviorprivileging norms, serve as the basis for structuring ideal behavior norms
for all members of society—whether sexed male or female, and for the in18
stitutions that serve them.

12 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States,
Zimbabwe and Malaysia, 17 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2005).
13 See id. at 1.
14 See id. at 2.
15 See id. at 2-3.
16 Joanne Conaghan’s analysis of the work of Duncan Kennedy is illuminating on this score.
Some early feminist approaches, drawing on Carol Gilligan's In a Different Voice, focused on the extent
to which legal reasoning was based on a masculine “ethic of rights” rather than a feminine “ethic of
care.” Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering
Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39 (1985) (applying Gilligan's work). Others looked at the allegedly neutral values and assumptions underpinning legal reasoning and exposed their partiality and
derivation from male points of view. See, e.g., Regina Graycar, THE GENDER OF JUDGMENTS: AN
INTRODUCTION, IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE: FEMINIST LEGAL DEBATES 262 (Margaret Thornton ed., 1995).
Later, such approaches became tainted with the stain of essentialism, and this may to some extent explain Kennedy's neglect of them. The idea of law as “gendering,” that is, as constitutive of gender categories and roles, is the (post)modern, anti-essentialist version of the argument. Joanne Conaghan, Wishful Thinking Or Bad Faith: A Feminist Encounter With Duncan Kennedy’s Critique Of Adjudication, 22
CARDOZO L. REV. 721, 742 & n.108 (2001).
17 For recent efforts to interrogate the subject, see generally MICHAEL KIMMEL, MANHOOD IN
AMERICA: A CULTURAL HISTORY (1996); E. ANTHONY ROTUNDO, AMERICAN MANHOOD:
TRANSFORMATIONS IN MASCULINITY FROM THE REVOLUTION TO THE MODERN ERA (1993); MARK E.
KANN, ON THE MAN QUESTION: GENDER AND CIVIC VIRTUE IN AMERICA (1991).
18 See Backer, supra note 2, at 3. Female space, even within some feminist discourse, is shared
space—mother and child. That seems to be the thrust of some of the most compelling feminist scholarship that has sought to overturn the male centered dynamic of social gendering—to posit a standard that
is centered on the female. See, e.g., MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY,
AND OTHER TWENTIETH-CENTURY TRAGEDIES 22-24 (1995) (positing a normative baseline in the
mother and child in which the male serves as the catch-all for ‘not-mother,’ and suggesting that a father
is a male who can conform his behavior to the ideal of ‘mother’).
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The reinforcement of male hierarchy was traditionally policed through
19
the regulation of sexual activity. Though sodomy laws, or laws like them,
have substantially disappeared from the Western world, informal policing
remains effective, primarily through the mechanisms of everyday social
rules in which gendered conduct ideals are vested with important social and
political consequences, sometimes still reinforced with laws of “general”
20
applicability. But, regulatory mechanisms also have a cultural and social
21
dimension. This complex web of regulatory networks, bounded in soft and
hard law, suggests the disciplinary techniques of social organization that
22
have been well explored by Michel Foucault. Gendered frameworks on
legitimate behavior, focusing on the male female binary, remain strong because they have become submerged in the general discourse of power and
universal behavior norms. We discuss what is right, just, appropriate, legitimate, but those discussions are grounded in a host of unspoken assumptions that revolve around a privileging of the male ideal. “Not only because
power imposes secrecy on those whom it dominates, but because it is perhaps just as indispensible to the latter: would they accept it if they did not
see it as a mere limit placed on their desire, leaving a measure of freedom . .
23
. intact?”
24
This gendering is also trans-cultural. The foundational nature of intra-male codes of maleness—goodness, right, the privileged social ideal in
both public and private sphere—finds expression through mechanisms consonant with the normative structure internalized by the particular communi25
In the United States, those
ties in which this naturalization occurs.
mechanisms are based on principles of Enlightenment rationalism, with an
26
undercurrent of religious foundationalism. American popular understanding of the disordered life as backdrop to the political action of the so-called
American Taliban provides a useful referent. In Muslim majority states, it

19 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Raping Sodomy and Sodomizing Rape: A Morality Tale About
the Transformation of Modern Sodomy Jurisprudence, 21 AM. J. CRIM. L. 37 (1993).
20 See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE
CLOSET 8-15, 85 (1999); CARL F. STYCHIN, A NATION BY RIGHTS: NATIONAL CULTURES, SEXUAL
IDENTITY POLITICS, AND THE DISCOURSE OF RIGHTS 34-39 (1998); Ruthann Robson, Assimilation,
Marriage, and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 717-18 (2002); Francisco Valdes, Theorizing
‘Outcrit’ Theories: Coalitional Method and Comparative Jurisprudential Experience —Racecrits,
Queercrits and Latcrits, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1265, 1296-98 (1999).
21 See MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION (Robert Hurley
trans., Random House 1978) (1976).
22 See id.
23 Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality: An Introduction (Vol. I) 89 (Robert Hurley, trans.,
New York: Vintage Books, 1990).
24 See Backer, supra note 2, at 3-4.
25 For
a discussion of Indian patriarchy along these lines, see generally,
RATNA KAPUR, SUBVERSIVE SIGHTS: FEMINIST ENGAGEMENTS WITH LAW IN INDIA (1996).
26 See Backer, supra note 2, at 22.
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is mediated through the language of religion and purity. This conflation of
manliness purity, and religiously based intra-male codes of religious and
political behavior, rationalized through law, was nicely exemplified in the
sodomy and corruption trials of Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia in the late
28
29
1990s, and in his subsequent rehabilitation. In developing states, gender
ideologies are sieved through a discourse of post-colonialism and a reinven30
tion of an idealized past. Others have developed these notions in India,
31
China and Korea with respect to state policy and women’s’ autonomy.
The reinforcement of male hierarchy was traditionally policed through
32
the regulation of sexual activity. Though sodomy laws, or laws like them,
have substantially disappeared from the Western world, informal policing
remains effective, primarily through the mechanisms of everyday social
rules in which gendered conduct ideals are vested with important social and
33
political consequences. In this guise, critical theory has been instrumental
in unmasking the continued power of gender, and especially its intersections with race, ethnicity, and religion in the construction of institutional
34
systems of power.
Intra-male behavior-privileging social ordering and its political effects
are also, to some extent, trans-historical. The notion of effeminacy and
political behavior, as a dynamic and still living theory of politics, is at least
35
as old as Aristotle. Conflations of physical, moral and political strength
are reflected in personal behavior, and give rise to permissions to upset the

27

See id.
See id.
29 See Larry Catá Backer, Of Sodomy and Corruption: Sex, Politics, Religion and Law in Malaysia, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY, Aug. 1, 2006, http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2006/08/of-sodomyand-corruption-sex-politics.html.
30 See Backer, supra note 2, at 2.
31 See Monica das Gupta et al., State Policies and Women’s Agency in China, the Republic of
Korea, and India, 1950-2000: Lessons From Contrasting Experiences, in CULTURE AND PUBLIC
ACTION 234-259 (Vijayendra Rao & Michael Walton, eds., Stanford CAS: Stanford University Press,
2004) (“These case studies illustrate the subtle ways in which states influence the manifestation of
cultural beliefs and values: most actions and policies are not gender neutral; they either increase or
decrease gender equity. They also illustrate the constant tension and negotiation between sate ideologies, state interests, and social norms.” Id., at 258).
32 See id. at 62; Backer, supra note 8, at 756-57.
33 See Backer, supra note 8, at 760-61. “The society that emerged in the 19th century. . . did not
confront sex with a fundamental refusal of recognition. On the contrary, it put into operation an entire
machinery for producing true discourses concerning it. . . . . Not however, by reason of some natural
property inherent in sex itself, but my virtue of the tactics of power immanent in this discourse.” Foucault, History of Sexuality, supra note 22, at 69-70. And then it moved that discourse underground as a
set of bedrock assumptions about the way things are that required no further exploration.
34 See, e.g., Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Directions of Critical Race
Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 329, 336-39 (2006); see generally CRITICAL
RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 1997).
35 See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS: A TREATISE ON GOVERNMENT (William Ellis trans., J.M. Dent &
Sons 1912) (350 B.C.).
28
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social order—that is, to act extra-legally. “Thus a general at the head of his
army will endeavour to dethrone the monarch, as Cyrus did Astyages, despising both his manner of life and his forces; his forces for want of action,
37
his life for its effeminacy . . . .” The end of tyranny and a certain effeminacy was also conflated:
Contempt also is often the cause of their destruction: for though, for
instance, those who raised themselves to the supreme power generally
preserved it; but those who received it from them have, to speak truth,
almost immediately all of them lost it; for, falling into an effeminate
way of life, they soon grew despicable, and generally fell victims to
38
conspiracies.
Effeminacy of mind and body could be ascribed to certain activities,
improperly indulged. For example, music:
for it must be admitted that in some cases nothing can prevent music
being attended, to a certain degree, with the bad effects which are ascribed to it; it is therefore clear that the learning of it should never
prevent the business of riper years, nor render the body effeminate and
unfit for the business of war or the State; but it should be practised by
39
the young, judged of by the old.
This is not merely the musings of an ancient citizen of a culture now no
longer current. It is reflected in the sexualization of politics. Thus, it has
been observed that “Far from being a theoretical abstraction in leftist ideology, the conflation of homosexuality and fascism seems to have marked an
40
opportunistic capitulation of theory in the face of popular sentiment.” The
opportunism actually masks a naturalization of behavior norm hierarchies
as a basis for political judgment, one that adds potency to judgments about
the legitimacy of political actors and the shape and deployment of the state
41
government. “The identification of proletarian revolution with values of
virility and sexual potency leads all too easily to an attribution of homosexuality to effeminacy to the enemy: this observation holds for the communists’ homosexualization of the fascist as much as it does for the fascists’
42
effeminization of the Jew.” In each case, homosexualization acts as an

36

See id.
Id. bk. III, ch. X.
38 Id.
39 Id. bk. VIII, ch. VI.
40 Andrew Hewitt, Political Inversions: Homosexuality, Fascism & the Modernist Imaginary 9
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University press, 1996).
41 See Backer, supra note 2, at 53-60.
42 Hewitt, supra note 39, at 9-10.
37
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intensifier of illegitimacy, a magnifier of the corruption and error of the
action to which the homosexualization—the disorder—is ascribed.
And this sexualization appears to permeate the foundational interpretive documents produced in defense of the adoption of the American Con43
stitution. It is expressed in national political discourse, in the rhetoric of
44
Senator Byrd with allusions to Roman Republican civic virtues. It is central even to the humor of the discourse of state politics as well, with “girlie
men” as a well understood compression of meaning—the individual who
behaves outside of acceptable (male) ender norms, whose conduct is per45
sonally corrupt but also corrupts the actions undertaken in that role.
Gender norm assumptions, gender behavior ordering and privileging,
is unconscious, and unconsciously embraced at all levels of society. It is so
deeply embedded in cultural understandings that it appears natural. Like
anti-Semitism in 19th and early 20th century Germany, gender role expectations and their naturalization within the legal order are so “fundamental to
the dominant world view and operation of a society, [that] they are taken for
granted, often not expressed in a manner commensurate with their prominence and significance or, when uttered, seen as worthy by others to be
46
noted and recorded.” As feminists have long argued in the context of mar47
riage as both social relationship and regulatory construct, regulations serve
48
to police identity norms, and patrol the borders of gender expectations.
Constitutional law itself is as subject to identity policing as marriage or
other legal frameworks that replicate and reinforce social understandings of
communal behaviors. It is best understood as “more than the mere articulation of a code of behavior or a preference for a particular group or physical
characteristic. Instead, [it refers] to the active attempt on the part of the
state to monitor, maintain, and manipulate identity, to patrol its borders in
much the same way a police officer might guard a jurisdictional boundary

43 See John Kang, Associate Professor of Law, Saint Thomas University School of Law, Presentation at the 12th Annual Meeting of LatCrit (Oct. 5, 2007).
44 See John Tierney, Byrd, at 85, Fills the Forum With Romans and Wrath, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20,
2002, at A1.
45 See Associated Press, California Gov. Not Sorry For 'Girlie Men' Remark: Democrats Blast
Schwarzenegger for Mocking Lawmakers, MSNBC NEWS, July 19, 2004, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5460326/.
46 DANIEL JONAH GOLDHAGEN, HITLER’S WILLING EXECUTIONERS: ORDINARY GERMANS AND
THE HOLOCAUST 32 (New York: Vintage Books 1996).
47 See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 Va. L.
Rev. 1901 (2000).
48 “Just as important as this setting of social norms, however, is the extent to which state regulations have also served over time to reproduce and police identity norms in the marriage context.” R.A.
Lenhardt, Beyond Analogy: Perez v. Sharp, Antimiscegenation Law, and the Fight For Same-Sex Marriage, 96 CAL. L. REV. 839, 882 (2008).
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or keep watch for an intruder.” That is precisely what Mansfield means to
do with a focus on presidential power under the constitution. It is to the way
in which Mansfield would gender the constitution in the service of legitimating certain Presidential behaviors that the paper turns to next.
III. A MASCULINE CONSTITUTIONALISM—EXTRA-LEGAL PRESIDENTIAL
POWER, RULE-OF-LAW LEGISLATURES, AND COURTS
It comes as no surprise, then, that male elites in the United States, like
those in other nations, continue to protect the male gender borderlands of
behavior norms. And there is no more powerful set of behavior norms than
law, and especially constitutional law, in the United States. Mansfield’s
immediate object is to make a specific case for the legitimacy of the Bush
Administration’s surveillance activities in the war on terror. In making that
50
case, he also suggests a broadly applicable constitutional jurisprudence,
which is increasingly heard in some quarters today. That broad set of constitutional jurisprudence is grounded in the general proposition that the
American Constitution does not advance merely a rule-of-law system as the
core of American political governance; instead, the federal Constitution
represents the whole of sovereign power vested in the federal government.
51
That whole power consists of two parts. The first is the inward-looking,
and domesticated system of rule-of-law constitutionalism that characterizes
52
the legislative and judicial powers. The other is outward looking, and
mandates the assertion of “extra-legal authority” by the American President
53
under certain circumstances, and against certain contingencies.
Mansfield’s defense of President Bush’s surveillance projects, and of
the broader constitutional project, are grounded in a complex system of
inversions, growing out of a juxtaposition of related binaries set against,
and building on, each other in a series of parallel analogies. These binaries
touch on both the peculiarities of the immediate substantive elements (surveillance, criminality, etc.) and on a parallelism of binary aggregations that
suggest a fidelity to an ultimate set of grundnorm binaries: survival/destruction, strong/weak, good/evil, and male/female.
The initial binary—and binary inversion—presented, is meant to set
54
up the arguments that follow. This initial binary focuses on “law/outlaw.”
49 Id. In this sense, the constitution is very much social design. See GRETCHEN RITTER, THE
CONSTITUTION AS SOCIAL DESIGN: GENDER AND CIVIC MEMBERSHIP IN THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 66 (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).
50 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
51 See id.
52 See id. For a discussion of constitutionalism in its rule of law framework, see Larry Catá
Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Analysis of Nationalist and Transnational Constitutionalism, 113:3 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2009).
53 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
54 See id.
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Mansfield poses the greater problem from an initially smaller source—
55
criminality. He suggests a foundational distinction in law between crimi56
nals and enemies. That distinction is based on the relationship of both
57
criminals, and of enemies, to the political state. According to Mansfield,
Criminals violate the law, and the law can be vindicated with police,
prosecutors, juries and judges who stay within the law: at least for the
most part the law vindicates itself. Enemies, however, not merely violate but oppose the law. They oppose our law and want to replace it
58
with theirs.
Criminals, the reader is told, operate within the law, and its frame59
work, but enemies fall outside the law and that framework. Enemies are
“outlaws”; criminals are merely anti-social people, who must be managed
60
in a bureaucratic state. Because enemies fall outside the territory marked
61
by law, they “need to be faced with extra-legal force.”
Of course, this binary, as proposed, ignores a number of things—two
of which are highlighted here. First, Mansfield appears to invert the tradi62
tional understanding of outlaw. Second, thus inverted, the binary is at
odds with an emerging American understanding of the relationship of law
63
to virtually all human activity.
With respect to the first point, in traditional understanding, to engage
in violations of law by, for example, an activity deemed criminal, was to
64
fall outside the law. For example, “Icelandic law understood itself as providing an arena in which a modified form of revenge could take place. . . .
[An individual] sued and he enforced the judgment unless he assigned his
action, in which case the responsibility devolved upon the assignee. The
law did not issue money judgments in disputes involving injuries or killing.
The penalty was outlawry, which allowed anyone to kill the outlaw with
55

See id.
See id.
57 See id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 See id.
61 Id.
62 See Joseph H. King, Jr., Outlaws and Outlier Doctrines: The Serious Misconduct Bar in Tort
Law, 43 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1018-19 (2002) (“At one time serious criminals were deemed
outlaws [who were denied the protection of the law] . . . ”). Cf. Dorothy Roberts, Torture and the Biopolitics of Race, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 229, 240 (2008) (“The terrorist is constructed as a stateless outlaw
. . .”).
63 Cf. Daniel F. Piar, Majority Rights, Minority Freedoms: Protestant Culture, Personal Autonomy, and Civil Liberties in Nineteenth Century America, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 987, 1006-07
(2006) (discussing the nineteenth century legal system’s treatment of individual rights—as people were
considered quite able to control themselves, the law was used sparingly; this was, in part, due to the hold
that religion had on society).
64 See King, supra note 62, at 1018-19.
56
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impunity and obliged the judgment holder to do so.” Outlaws could include any individual, from the poor person who stole a loaf of bread to feed
a starving family, to a foreign resident the Queen deemed to have engaged
in political acts of treason. In contrast, enemies did not fall outside the domestic law, never having been within it, but they fell within the rule sys66
tems guiding conduct among combatants, with both hard and soft content.
Mansfield would reverse these ancient understandings to suit his very modern purpose.
The second point, which suggests that enemies are conceptually incapable of being treated as criminals, rejects what has, since the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials of defeated political enemies, been a fundamentally
American project of constructing an international system that does just
67
that. Post-war American efforts (to the political establishment’s current
chagrin it seems) have produced an international consensus that tends increasingly to view all anti-social activity as criminal, irrespective of its na68
ture or consequence. The criminalization of political and state activity
within an international context has substantially changed the dynamics of
the old binary insider/outsider, and internal/external conflict within a new
69
regime of “law-fare”—warfare in the courts.
The regime of international political criminality, subsumed within the
regimen of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, thus suggests that there may no longer be much of an area of activity “outside” the
70
law. It is true enough that Americans have resisted the implications of
71
this, as it applies to its international activities. The conceptual framework
that gave it life, however, is as much a core set of American jurisprudential
values as any recognized within the framework of the federal Constitution.
Yet the “law/outlaw” binary also serves to reinforce the gendered basis
of Mansfield’s argument. Law and criminality are tied to the domestic, to
the internal matters of state. Criminals are a matter of family. Enemies are
65 William Ian Miller, In Defense of Revenge, in MEDIEVAL CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL 74
(Barbara A. Hanawalt and David Wallace, eds. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
66 See Jordan J. Paust, Responding Lawfully to Al Qaeda, 56 CATH. U. L. REV. 759, 767 (2007)
(discussing the legal treatment of the so-called enemy-combatants).
67 See generally Salvatore Zappala, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
(2003).
68 Cf. Erik Luna, A Place for Comparative Criminal Procedure, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 277, 302
(2004) (“[S]ome Marxist-Leninist regimes have criminalized ‘social dangerousness,’ an apparent catchall category authorizing prosecutions of supposedly anti-social conduct without reference to specifically
defined criminal behavior. . . . .”).
69 For a critical discussion, see W. Chadwick Austin & Antony Barone Kolenc Who's Afraid of the
Big Bad Wolf? The International Criminal Court as a Weapon of Asymmetric Warfare, 39 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 291 (2006).
70 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: Overview (1998-99), available at
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/icc/general/overview.htm.
71 See Lillian V. Faulhaber, American Servicemembers’ Protection Act of 2002, 40 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 537, 542-543 (2003) (discussing “American opposition to the ICC”).
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tied to a public space, to external activities, and to the world of nondomestic work. This gendered distinction, which feminist theory has explored in the construction of national and international legal systems, and in
72
the social spaces produced thereby, becomes the crucial first step in Mansfield’s project to articulate an essentially male space “beyond” law.
Having asserted the possibility of a dual space for anti-social activity—within and without the law—Mansfield invokes a complex parallelism
of related binaries that will build on each other to produce the necessary
support for his thesis: that the American Constitution provides the President
with a grant of “extra-legal” power to be used in the President’s discretion
73
against enemies of the nation. That grant of extra- legal power is foundational to the nature and character of the executive authority granted to the
74
Chief Executive, created through Article II of the federal Constitution,
without which, it would be impossible to understand the office of the Chief
Executive as an independent and co-equal branch of the federal government. The federal Constitution, Mansfield tells the reader, created a strong
75
executive. “A strong executive is one that is not confined to executing the
laws but has extra-legal powers such as commanding the military, making
treaties . . . and pardoning the convicted, not to mention a veto of legisla76
tion.” This is a thesis far broader than the usual iteration of similar no77
tions in the traditional “unitary executive” theory. Rule-of-law unitary
executives remain firmly grounded in the rule-of-law system of the Consti78
tution, and subject to its constraints. Mansfield’s executive is not.
To get to this understanding of extra-legal Presidential power,
grounded in the law of the Constitution, Mansfield deploys his second great
79
80
binary—“law/discretion” —and suggests its inversion as well. In fleshing out this binary, a key concept in Mansfield’s argument, Mansfield deploys a series of parallel supporting binaries, each to serve as an analogue
for, and reflection of the others; all of which are intimately tied to the foun72 See generally Frances Olsen, International Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private
Distinction, in RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 157 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer
ed., 1993).
73 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
74 See U.S. CONST. art. II.
75 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
76 Id.
77 See Steven G. Calabresi & Kevin H. Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Executive,
Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155, 1216 (1992).
78 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
79 The law/discretion binary has a long and contentious history in the United States. For its
application in the context of the shaping of immigration law at the end of the 19th century, see LUCY E.
SALYER, LAWS HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION
LAW (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1995). In the context of criminal law, see,
e.g., Samuel Walker, TAMING THE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OF DISCRETION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 19501990 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993).
80 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
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dational governing binaries of the American state, which lurk in the background until the very end—survival/destruction, strong/weak,
81
male/female. Mansfield seeks to describe a well-ordered governmental
house, in which the functional differentiation inherent in separation of powers is both necessary and natural given the characteristics of each of the
elements of government—a domestic and rule-bound legislature, and judiciary—in contradistinction to the assertive and unbound protective power
82
of the executive. Constitutionalism merely institutionalizes and assimi83
lates these natural distinctions.
Presidential extra-legal activities, like surveillance, are not illegal
84
merely because they fall outside the law, Mansfield argues. Assertions of
extra-legal power are lawful because the American rule-of-law system,
founded on the federal Constitution, permits lawless activity under the cir85
cumstances therein specified. Thus, according to Mansfield, “it is wrong
to accuse President Bush of acting illegally in the surveillance of possible
86
enemies, as if that were a crime and legality is all that matters.” Notice
87
here the conflation of binaries “criminal/enemy” and “law/extra-legal.”
The argument points to the need to protect the order of household administration, and the fear that a disordered house, where the rules of functionally
differentiated power are not observed, will serve to pull down the house
88
altogether.
It is at this point that Mansfield makes his alternative, and critical, argument. He suggests that constitutional rule-of-law must be understood as
constitutionally limited, that is, of occupying only part of the governance
89
space described by the Constitution in the government it creates. This
leads to an interrogation—and ultimate limitation—of the scope of a properly understood constitutional rule-of-law system. Mansfield suggests that
there is no identity between constitutional rule-of-law and constitutional90
ism, at least in the American context. “The Constitution took seriously a
difficulty in the rule of law that the republican tradition before 1787 had

81

Id.
Id.
83 From a different, and outsider perspective, these are the distinctions on which compulsory
heterosexuality, grounded in male centered hierarchy, are normalized. See, e.g., Ruthann Robson, Marriage and Lesbian Liberation, 75 TEMP. L. REV. 709, 819-820 (2002).
84 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
85 See id.
86 Id.
87 See id.
88 This notion of domestic and political disorder, founded on the decay of gendered functionally
differentiated roles, and the need to protect them, is old in Anglo-American socio-politics. See CYNTHIA
B. HERRUP, A HOUSE OF GROSS DISORDER: SEX, LAW, AND THE 2ND EARL OF CASTLEHAVEN 37 (1999).
89 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
90 See id.
82
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91

slighted.” Rule-of-law, understood as a form of “standing rules,” is an
appropriate subject for ordinary legislative functioning—power in the hands
of many, rule supremacy over discretionary power, etc. It is focused on the
domestic sphere. In a domestically focused context, legislative power can
be favored over the executive, and law over discretion.
Rule-of-law constitutionalism is female space. For Mansfield, this
space can only partially describe the extent of actual governmental (or
state) power that could be lawfully asserted under our constitutional grant
of sovereign power to the institutions of the federal government. He tells
the reader: “[y]et the rule of law is not enough to run a government,” and it
92
was government that the Constitution created. Rule-of-law, and even constitutional rule-of-law constitutionalism, must then itself be limited within
an overall theory of governance. Mansfield appears to suggest that implicit
in the Constitution is the idea that an appropriately constituted government
needs “both the rule of law and the power to escape it—and that twofold
93
need is just what the Constitution provides for.” The Constitution thus
provides a framework in which two conceptions of legitimate state authority co-exist. The first is the ordinary rule-of-law governance, understood as
a state constituted from democratic principles and grounded in legislative
94
superiority
But while this is a necessary framework for establishing a
legitimate state, it is also an insufficient basis for constituting a state that
95
lasts, because of the “inflexibility of the rule of law.” Fidelity to the constitution requires its interpretation as a system that is both efficient in general and which does not hobble the state in its operation, if in so hobbling,
96
the Republic is rendered inoperable.
As such, the constitution must include provision for the assertion of all
authority necessary to ensure its preservation, and that authority out to be
consonant with the nature of the power given to each branch of government. Rule of law is appropriate to collegial bodies where power is by
definition diffused among many co-equal individuals. That is the essence
of the legislature and judicial power. Yet, state authority is incomplete
without a way around rule of law to be asserted by the executive as necessary to save the state from internal and external threats against which rule
of law governance provides no defense. This principle of extra-legal constitutionally legitimate authority, of course, has its own limitations and
risks. And Mansfield does not avoid naming them. That danger is the well

91

Id.
Id.
93 Id.
94 See Larry Catá Backer, From Constitution to Constitutionalism: A Framework for Analysis of
Nationalist and Transnational Constitutionalism, 113:3 PENN STATE LAW REVIEW (forthcoming 2009).
95 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
96 Cf. McColloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819).
92
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documented (even in a strongly Republican system) the risk of Caesarism
97
in our executive. The echoes of Aristotle’s “family/state” political theory
98
are strong. Rule-of-law corresponds to law and criminality; discretion
corresponds to extra-legal power and enemies of the state. Ironically, of
course, that risk is probably greater when the executive is a likeable chap
(perhaps a future president) than, in the case of the second President Bush
(for whose immediate benefit Mansfield articulated his interpretive theory),
whose popularity among the masses, media and elites is quite low.
How does the Constitution provide space for both a limited rule-of-law
system and democratic Caesarism? Mansfield suggests that the doctrines of
separation of powers, and checks and balances, starkly highlight this consti99
tutional binary between (rule of) law and discretion. Law is built into the
legislative and judicial branches—but not into the core of the executive
100
function. The legislature and the judiciary are bound by rule-of-law constitutionalism; law is the thing they produce and manage and to which they
101
are subject. This, Mansfield describes as the choice aspects of constitu102
tionalism.
But the higher law of the Constitution constitutes the lawful
103
power of the President differently. The “executive power represents ne104
cessity in the form of responses to emergencies.” He elaborates:
The Constitution mixes choice and necessity, reflecting our desire for
self-government (which takes effect in our legislature) and our recognition of the limitations of human foresight and the imperfection of
human laws. These are opposite principles made into opposing ele105
ments of our government.
Together, they form the entirety of the constitution of lawful power
that may be asserted by the State. Thus, Mansfield uses a traditional separation of powers analysis as the basis for the support of a non-rule-of-law
legal system. Separation of powers serves as a proxy for the split between
the rule-of-law governance (by legislation and the judiciary) and extra-legal
executive power. In this, it serves as an idealized and institutional version
of the separation of functions in a marriage. And with this separation is
understood to come a necessary hierarchy, reflecting the division of author-

97

Mansfield, supra note 9.
See ARISTOTLE, supra note 24, bk. I, ch. V. Modern variants, as I have suggested, in this conflation, are also trans-cultural and historical. See generally MATTHEW H. SOMMER, SEX, LAW AND
SOCIETY IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (2000).
99 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
100 See id.
101 See id.
102 Id.
103 See id.
104 Id.
105 Id.
98
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106

ity between a man and his wife. The West has understood these gendered
divisions of institutional functions for a long time before the founding of
the Republic. These functional differentiations, and the hierarchies they
give rise to, as well as the fundamentally gendered nature of the division,
has long served as, for example, a foundation of the organization of power
107
within the Catholic Church, and the Church’s relationship to the Trinity.
But they are also complementary principles. By fiercely asserting the
bases of each of their powers, the three branches serve to check the others,
108
producing a democratic whole. “The Constitution maintains both opposite principles by arranging for an interested party or parties to support [its
109
organizing principle] in exercising its power.” Checks and balances thus
serve as a proxy for the only constitutionally permitted basis for controlling
the ascendancy of either a hidebound rule-of-law state on the one hand, or
110
Caesarism on the other. Consequently, the structural or principled limitations of rule of law governance as a structural basis for limiting the assertions of power by any branch of government must give way to political
exigency—and thus subject only to the power of the other branches to resist
by resort to those mechanisms constitutionally granted them, or to that of
the electorate. Thus, according to Mansfield, “there will be conflict between discretion and the rule-of-law, each party aware of the other principle
111
but more convinced by its own.”
And thus, the Constitutional framework is reduced to a great binary in
motion: the American government is thus a combustion engine that operates
as the force of a constant series of explosions among the branches, moving
the pistons of state from monarchism to republicanism, while avoiding the
112
extremes of tyranny and demagogic democracy.
Still, this argument
would have to confront over a century of jurisprudence suggesting signifi113
cant limits on Presidential “extra-legal” power, as well as modern rule-of106

See generally GEORGE GILDER, MEN AND MARRIAGE (1992).
See, e.g., Angela L. Padilla & Jennifer J. Winrich, Christianity, Feminism, and the Law, 1
COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 67, 75-87 (1991) (discussing the “traditional Christian worldview [which]
ascribes to men and women separate, specific, and immutable social roles”). Thus, for example, the
Church (in its institutional guise) has long been associated with Mary—female, mother of Jesus, nurturer, domestic, etc.—in contradistinction to the Trinity—a transcendent power to be sure, but invariably
depicted in its male form within Christianity (other than, perhaps, in its incarnation as Holy Spirit:
ethereal, in between, and transformative). See, e.g., id.; Cheryl B. Preston, Feminism and Faith: Reflections on the Mormon Heavenly Mother, 2 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 337, 357 (1993) (discussing the “traditional trinity of Catholicism,” and whether it is “entirely male”). The relationship between the Church
and the Divine is the foundational organizational model that then serves to organize the family and the
state.
108 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
109 Id.
110 See id.
111 Id.
112 See id.
113 See, e.g., Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. 603 (1850).
107
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law based arguments for curtailing (or taming) the extra-legal power of the
114
President. Though he devotes no time to it, it might be reasonable to assume that Mansfield would dismiss over a century of rule-of-law jurisprudence that clearly views the President in a far less extra-legal power capacity as partisan—that is, as efforts by one branch to control another—and on
that basis to constitute a less authoritative interpretive source.
The law/discretion binary thus serves as a cover for a number of parallel binaries—active/passive, individual/group, monarchy/republic, separation of powers/checks and balances. But Mansfield is not done with separation of powers. He elaborates by drawing support from the Federalist Papers, which he refers to as “the most authoritative source for understanding
115
the thinking of the Framers.”
He also seems to draw on his interpretation
of the cultural context of gender-social assumptions that were current at the
time of the Founding as the basis for reading those authoritative works as
116
political documents. Mansfield reads the Federalist Papers to strengthen
117
the idea that the Framers had meant to constitute a republican monarchy.
118
Responsibility is vested in the executive.
“To be sure of responsibility
you must fix it on one person; true responsibility is sole responsibility. That
is why, under our republican Constitution, the people, when they want to
hold the whole government responsible, end up holding the president re119
sponsible.” The logic of this progression is not beyond dispute, and indeed its simplicity and naiveté seem to serve as the greatest arguments
against it. Whatever the value of Mansfield’s insight, he uses it to buttress
the law/discretion binary, and its formal incorporation into the American
120
constitutional order.

114 For a taste of the current version of these arguments, from a national and transnational perspective, and well cited to earlier work, see generally Ingrid Brunk Wurth, International Law and Constitutional Interpretation: The Commander in Chief Clause Reconsidered, 106 MICH. L. REV. 61 (2007);
Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal Constraints on Executive Power, 54
UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007).
115 Mansfield, supra note 9.
116 C.f. ROTUNDO, supra note 6. There is irony here, for Mansfield is engaging in that most postmodern of tasks, the interrogation of text within the social, cultural, political, religious, and ethnic
context in which it was framed. Progressive post-modern and critical theory engages in this task to
expose and eliminate the subordinating and hierarchical elements in the work (or to reject the theories as
beyond “salvation”), an exercise which, arguably, is necessarily contingent and incomplete. See Larry
Catá Backer, Queering Theory: An Essay on the Conceit of Revolution in Law, in LEGAL QUEERIES:
LESBIAN, GAY AND TRANSGENDER LEGAL STUDIES 185-203 (Leslie J. Moran, et al. eds., 1998). Mansfield and traditionalists use similar techniques to convince the reader that one must accept (and live) the
social, cultural, ethnic, religious, and political context from which these works arose. Thus, the techniques of progressive critical theory can be as useful to the traditionalist as they are to the progressive—
with both techniques successfully using interrogation and analysis.
117 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
118 See id.
119 Id.
120 See id.
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Yet he also uses selective references to the Federalist Papers for another purpose: to privilege the constitutional principle of efficient govern121
ment (corresponding to European constitutional notions of effet utile)
122
over the anti-tyranny principle built into rule-of-law governance. Mansfield conflates the idea that the Framers sought to make a strong executive
123
“in order to have both power and security,” with a fundamental reconsideration of the meaning of separation of powers. That reconsideration leads
to a reconstitution of the unitary part of the unitary executive. Separation of
powers is characterized as a 17th century invention improved by the Fram124
125
ers.
That improvement consisted of a strengthening of the executive.
“They enabled the executive to act independently of the legislature [something Mansfield now suggests would be impossible in a monopolistic ruleof-law constitutional order] and not merely to serve as its agent in executing
126
the laws.”
What does Mansfield mean? Perhaps he is suggesting that the executive, in order to be denominated as such, must exist not merely as a servant
of the legislature and the courts, but must be able to assert power in his own
right. But the only sort of power that the executive may assert in his own
right must be extra-legal—that is extra-legislative—power. Otherwise, he
remains merely the subordinate and minister of the legislature and the
courts. If the Constitution means what it says—and it says that it created
127
three co-equal branches of government that together constitute the state —
then the executive must be able to assert an authority equal to, and independent of, that of the other branches. Mansfield seems to suggest that this
128
extra-legal power may only be asserted in emergencies, but asserted it
must if the executive is to be co-equal. Thus, separation of powers suggests
that to assert lawful power, the President must be able (in an emergency) to
disregard the law. His actions may be illegal (that is, contrary to the power
of Congress to legislate and the courts to hear cases), but not unconstitu-

121 See, e.g., Kristien Vanvoorden, Cases and Comments: Case C-200/02, Zhu and Chen v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 12 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 305, 317-18 (2005). Effet utile, as a constitutional proposition, permits a certain flexibility in rule-of-law order for the effectuation of foundational obligations. See Ian S. Forrester, The Judicial Function in European Law and Pleading in European Law, 81 TUL. L. REV. 647, 673 (2007). In the context of the work of the European Court of Justice
(ECJ), the point has been stressed that “[t]he ECJ has been willing to look sympathetically at claims
which have the effect of making Community law more efficient and remedies more effective – effet util
[sic] is an untranslatable phrase connoting teleological efficacy.” Id. This, of course, is Mansfield’s
point, though from a different and more disordered perspective.
122 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
123 Id.
124 See id.
125 See id.
126 Id.
127 See U.S. CONST. art. I- art. III.
128 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
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tional (that is, exceeding the lawful powers of his office as set forth in the
Constitution itself). “Emergency action of this kind may be illegal but not
unconstitutional; or since the Constitution is a law, it is not illegal under the
129
Constitution.”
The law/discretion binary is thus critical to the development of Mansfield’s constitutional theory of a constitutionalism in which rule-of-law aspects of the Constitution are separable from a legal power to avoid law.
But, the law/discretion binary subsumes a number of other binaries running
in parallel. And it is those supporting binaries, to binaries that seem drawn
130
from “natural,” that Mansfield invokes. And it is in this effort that Mansfield’s reliance on strict gendering, and the conflation of power, law, and
social organization in gendered terms is most easily visible. Mansfield
speaks of the binary law/discretion in terms of responsibility versus irresponsibility, of efficiency of individual action versus inefficiency of consensus or institutional action, of the rule-of-law versus necessity in extre131
mis. But, again grounding analysis on his extractions from the Federalist
Papers, he focuses on another set of binaries that he suggests run in parallel,
or serve to illustrate the law/discretion binary: energy versus stability,
“terms taken from physics to designate discretion and law. Energy has its
place in the executive, and the foremost guarantee of energy is unity . . . .
132
The PresiUnity facilitates ‘decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch.’”
dent must be understood as a constitutionally mandatory nexus-point for
133
energy, discretion, unity, singularity and responsibility.
134
Thus, the president appears as the embodiment of the male principle.
The legislature and judiciary are not. These institutions represent the fe135
male principle. Stability, nurture, standing rules, consensus and limitation
of power serve as the constitutionally mandatory expression of the construction of an institutional and limited assertion of its form and content.
Mansfield thus constructs a constitutional theory based on those binaries at
the heart of gendered social ordering. Male/female, strong/weak, public/private, these are the parallels used to justify a division in which men
136
dominate the state and women are relegated to civil society.

129

Id.
See MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 196-98.
131 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
132 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton)).
133 See id.
134 See MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 23-49 (exploring the notion of “manliness” in the context of
gender-based stereotypes).
135 See id.
136 See Frances Olsen, International Law: Feminist Critiques of the Public/Private Distinction, in
RECONCEIVING REALITY: WOMEN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 157, 164 (Dorinda G. Dallmeyer ed.,
1993).
130
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And here, Mansfield is able to begin to bring the analysis around to its
conclusion—that secrecy is the sort of action that is most consonant with
137
energy, and the responsibility, properly understood, of the executive.
Thus, Mansfield argues, “secrecy is compatible with responsibility because,
when one person is responsible, it does not matter how he arrives at his
138
decision.” By implication, secrecy might be incompatible with law (and
the rule-of-law)—with stability—a telling point—but not for Mansfield.
Instead, that parallelism suggests the need for lawlessness in the executive
rather than an absence of secrecy within government, considered as a
139
whole. Secrecy is incompatible with law, but perfectly compatible with
140
responsibility bound up in the body of a single executive. This practice,
Mansfield suggests, is truer to American cultural practice than a more collegial and institutionalized decision-making process subsumed under the
141
legislation rule-of-law model.
Thus, the attempt to bring secrecy under
the law is the same, for Mansfield, as bringing the President under Congress
and the Courts as a mere minister of enforcement of law. It is in this context that Mansfield would prefer surveillance and torture to be understood
in the American constitutional context: the rule-of-law cannot apply when
law does not apply—in those emergencies in which a President must assert
142
a lawless, masculine, virile, protective, singular power. “You have to do
what you have to do” reminds Mansfield, quoting John McCain, on the
143
issue of torture. Surveillance reasserts a private/public distinction at the
144
heart of gendered ordering of law and politics.
There is thus a space within American constitutionalism, Mansfield
145
argues, “when liberties are dangerous and law does not apply.” Lawless137

See Mansfield, supra note 9.
Id.
139 For a discussion of the difficulties of surveillance in law, and the rise of lawmaking through
surveillance, see Larry Catá Backer, Global Panopticism: <States, Corporations, and the Governance
Effects of Monitoring Regimes, 15(1) IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 101 (2008).
140 See Mansfield, supra note 9 (stating that “secrecy is necessary to government yet almost incompatible with the rule of law… [y]et secrecy is compatible with responsibility because, when one
person is responsible, it does not matter how he arrives at his decision”).
141 See id. (arguing that the Framers intended this “unity in one person” because it facilitates
“decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch”). For another reading of this gendering and the “civic virtues,”
see generally MARK E. KANN, ON THE MAN QUESTION: GENDER AND CIVIC VIRTUE IN AMERICA
(1991).
142 See Mansfield, supra note 9 (arguing that “[O]ur Constitution, properly understood, shows
that” there is a way to deal with necessity—not under the rule-of-law, but side-by-side with the rule-oflaw); see also MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 56 (“[M]anliness appears first not as a claim of authority
but as the assertion of virtue against authority, an assertion always required because authority is always
in the way of virtue. . . .”).
143 Mansfield, supra note 9.
144 See MANSFIELD, supra note 23, at 61 (arguing that it takes a quality of manliness to cross the
public/private lines that are drawn in our society); Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Public/Private
Distinction, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3-4 (1992).
145 Mansfield, supra note 9.
138
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ness of this sort is both moral and lawful, precisely because it rejects the
146
weakness and stability of rule-of-law constitutionalism. The higher law of
the Constitution is said to solve this problem by making lawless actions
147
The male principle is thus embedded in the uniqueness of the
lawful.
Presidential office. And, in this way, Mansfield would undo two hundred
years of American jurisprudence built in the blood of the colonists’ English
forbearers, who took down a Stuart king of England and Scotland to defend
the primacy of law—organic, extra governmental—and binding on a mon148
This
arch who would also assert the virile power of lawless activity.
149
binding power once severed the neck of a King to the power of law.
Mansfield forgets that the American republic was built on that scaffold.
For Mansfield, then, a federal Constitution that is bound solely by
rule-of-law constitutionalism, a constitution in which legislative and interpretive power appear to set the boundaries of executive action, is a constitu150
Rule-of-law constitutionaltion that is defective, and defectively male.
151
ism is essentially defectively male, effeminate, and thus female. This is
to be despised, as Mary Anne Case reminds us, for two reasons: “The man
who exhibits feminine qualities is doubly despised, for manifesting the disfavored qualities and for descending from his masculine gender privilege to
152
153
do so.”
The male principle —energy, discretion, responsibility, singu154
larity, and unity —must serve to provide a space in which lawlessness is
lawful. Mansfield thus builds on binaries, with significant gendered tones,
to present a picture of an appropriately manly construction of the constitution. Still, consider the consequence for such a construction of American
law: rule-of-law constitutionalism is female, and incomplete, without the
146 See, e.g., MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 61-62 (arguing that while “we don’t want people to . . .
cross [the] line . . . on subjects for which we have an established law . . .” manliness, through its assertiveness and reasoning, can effectively cross that line).
147 See Mansfield, supra note 9 (“[W]e need both the rule of law and the power to escape it—and
that twofold need is just what the Constitution provides for.”).
148 See generally KEVIN PHILLIPS, THE COUSINS’ WARS: RELIGION, POLITICS, AND THE TRIUMPH
OF ANGLO-AMERICA (2006) (discussing the issues, causes, and justifications behind the war, which
involved issues of class, religion, and a drive for control of an unbounded power between Parliament
and Crown).
149 See id.
150 See Mansfield, supra note 9 (“There will be conflict between discretion and the rule of law,
each party aware of the other principle but more convinced by its own . . . [i]n combining law and discretion, the Framers of the Constitution made a deliberate departure from the sorry history of previous
republics . . . .”).
151 See MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 64 (arguing that manliness is distinguished from feminine by
its assertiveness and willingness to exercise reasoned power, outside the rule-of-law—“lacking as
women are, comparatively, in aggression and assertiveness, it is no surprise that men have ruled over all
societies at almost all times”).
152 Mary Anne C. Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The Effeminate
Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1995).
153 See generally MANSFIELD, supra note 32.
154 See generally Mansfield, supra note 9.
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male principle of governance—a certain lawlessness in the executive. That
lawlessness is to be used against the enemies of the state, against which
155
rule-of-law limitations do not apply. In this constitutional order—
surveillance, torture, military tribunals, military action without Congressional approval—all would follow the power of the President as Com156
mander in Chief.
Extension of the rule-of-law to the executive reduces
the President to something less than complete—in gendered terms, a defective male—and that would produce a parallel defect in the American consti157
tutional legal order.
Because the Founders could not have intended the
creation of an effeminate legal order, the President must be accorded extra158
legal constitutional power. Mansfield would label this “monarchical re159
publicanism.”
For all of that, Mansfield has not created a constitutional theory out of
whole cloth. Instead, whether he knows it or not, he has drawn on a rich
source of ancient constitutional theory that long predates the founding of
the Republic. This constitutional theory, going back to Bracton in England,
suggests a division between the lawmaking and executive function—that is,
160
between gubernaculum and jurisdictio.
Within the sphere of gubernaculum, the power of those who hold authority to act is absolute. That power could be expressed by action—
the enforcement action of the state—and also by enactment of law,
narrowly conceived. The narrowness of the conception is grounded in
the fundamental distinction between enactments of an administrative
161
character, and the power to define a legal right.
The lawmaking function is essentially organic, customary, conservative,
and communal, and not lightly disturbed. “I think it extremely dangerous to
make any change in the law touching the constitution. . . . But to touch
155

See id. (“[E]nemies, being extra-legal, need to be faced with extra-legal force.”).
See John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1183, 1200-01 (2004) (arguing
that there are multiple Constitutional bases for extra-legal presidential power: “[e]ven if the Constitution’s entrustment of the Commander in Chief power to the President did not bestow upon him the
authority to make unilateral determinations regarding the disposition of captured enemies, the President
would nevertheless enjoy such a power by virtue of the broad sweep of the Vesting Clause.”); see also
Mansfield, supra note 9 (“[T]hus it is wrong to accuse President Bush of acting illegally in the surveillance of possible enemies, as if that were a crime and legality is all that matters”).
157 Mansfield, supra note 9 (“[T]he rule of law is not enough to run a government . . . [i]n Machiavelli’s terms, ordinary power needs to be supplemented or corrected by the extraordinary power of a
prince . . . .”).
158 See id. (“The Framers improved [the Constitution] when they strengthened the executive. They
enabled the executive to act independently . . . .”).
159 See id. (comparing Presidents’ exercise of executive powers to that of a prince).
160 See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE “HIGHER LAW” BACKGROUND OF AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Cornell Univ. Press, 1971) (1955).
161 See Larry Catá Backer, Reifying Law: Government, Law and the Rule of Law in Governance
Systems, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 521, 527 (2008).
156
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the laws of the constitution is as dangerous as to undermine the foundations, or remove the cornerstone on which the whole weight of the building
162
rests.” Lawmaking is thus to be distinguished from the executive function
of the executive—traditionally the monarch—whose principal obligation
163
was to maintain the integrity of the state. This division was the basis of
164
Stuart absolutism — an absolutism that appears to have survived the beheading of Charles I in 1649 and now reappears in its more pristine traditional form, in the guise of Mansfield’s muscular, extra-legal, power165
wielding executive.
This is not merely traditionalism, or even original
understanding; this might well be a reactionary stance, even by the stan166
dards of the Founding generation.
Yet, Mansfield’s underlying gendered analysis causes an inversion of
original doctrine and a perversion of traditional male ordering. Still, the
ordering survives his analysis. That is because gendered action is still at the
167
core of the value system at the foundation of the Republic. Mansfield’s
168
169
essay suggested the ironies inherent in his articulation of manliness,
through Presidential extra-legal muscularity. A great irony centers on Hamilton’s poorly remembered justification for union as a means to protect
170
rights and the rule-of-law, set out in Federalist No. 8. Hamilton suggested
that the United States, like Great Britain, can profit from union, because of
its geographic position as a state insulated from constant warfare and the
171
need to defend its territory.
In such a context, the rights of the people
(and their resolve to protect these rights) would be strengthened, and their
172
otherwise justifiable fear of a military state would be diminished.
There is a wide difference, also, between military establishments in a
country seldom exposed by its situation to internal invasions, and in
one which is often subject to them and always apprehensive of them . .
162 JEAN BODIN, SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH, 125 (M. J. Tooley trans., Basil Blackwell
Oxford 1955) (1576).
163 See CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM: ANCIENT AND MODERN 86 (rev. ed.
1947).
164 See id.
165 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
166 See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton) (“Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice of their
views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a numerous legislature. They have with great
propriety, considered energy . . . as most applicable to power in a single hand, while they have, with
equal propriety, considered the latter as best adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to
conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their privileges and interests.”).
167 See MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 58 (“Our democracy up to now, has been some kind of
patriarchy, permeated by stubborn, self-insistent manliness.”) (italics in original).
168 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
169 See generally MANSFIELD, supra note 32.
170 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 8 (Alexander Hamilton).
171 See id.
172 See id.
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. the perpetual menacings of danger oblige the government to be always prepared to repel it, her armies must be numerous enough for instant defence. The continual necessity for his services enhances the
importance of the soldier, and proportionably degrades the condition
of the citizen. The military state becomes elevated above the civil.
The inhabitants of territories often the theatre of war, are unavoidably
subjected to frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to
weaken their sense of those rights; and by degrees, the people are
brought to consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as
their superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of considering them as masters, is neither remote nor difficult: but it is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions, to make a bold
or effectual resistance, to usurpations supported by the military
173
power.
Mansfield will take this insight and turn it on its head, suggesting a notion of rule-of-law as both effeminate and passive that was once, more ap174
propriately, the province of more totalitarian ideologies.
But, even the
focus on surveillance suggests inversion: the object of strong executive
175
But surextra-legal power is surveillance in the protection of the state.
veillance itself was traditionally gendered female—the sort of thing gen176
tlemen will not do. But, surveillance appears to become male in the face
of a greater failure of maleness—the resort to terror in lieu of traditional
acts of war between equals. Terror is depicted as cowardly, sneaky, conspiratorial, dishonorable, uncontrolled and reactive—all of the attributes of
177
It follows that terror would
the traditionally depicted defective male.
itself likely be gendered female, causing a “cure” or at least a rehabilitation
of surveillance.
Mansfield thus suggests that as the Presidential Power is gendered
male, the President’s Constitutional powers extend beyond the mere execu-

173

Id.
See, e.g., MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 18 (“[I]n our century . . . we have seen the epitome of
manliness in fascism.”); See generally BENITO MUSSOLINI, FUNDAMENTAL IDEAS (Ion Munro trans.,
1933) (1932), reprinted in READINGS ON FASCISM AND NATIONAL SOCIALISM (Alan Swallow ed., 2004),
available at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14058/14058.txt.
175 See Mansfield, supra note 9.
176 See generally Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890) (suggesting that the invasion of privacy by the yellow press was ungentlemanly); see also
MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 49 (suggesting that, according to Kipling and Darwinians, females have a
disregard for abstract justice in the form of dire necessity and ferocity).
177 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Constructing a ‘Homosexual’ for Constitutional Theory:
Sodomy Narrative, Jurisprudence, and Antipathy in United States and British Courts, 71 TUL. L. REV.
529 (1996); see also MANSFIELD, supra note 32, at 49 (“[D]espite the deadliness of females and cowardice of men, for Kipling women can not win and the sex roles remain.”).
174
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178

“Thus it is wrong to accuse President Bush of acting
tion of the laws.
illegally in the surveillance of possible enemies, as if that were a crime and
179
legality is all that matters.” If law is male, Mansfield suggests, then ruleof-law is defectively male (and thus subordinate as female)—passive, doc180
ile and risk averse.
He effectively suggests an Aristotelian political ef181
feminacy —and not as a source of strength. And by imposing and enforcing these differences, differences based on a need to distinguish male from
female behavior—to distinguish more from less valued behavior—
Mansfield’s exercise in “manliness” is symptomatic of the more subtle, and
corroding, subversive nature of the hierarchy of male gendering. Intrasexual gender role hierarchies, based on a normative model of male role
supremacy, continue to marginalize the normatively female, both within
each sex and between the sexes. When this marginalization becomes the
stuff of constitutional analysis, caudillismo cannot be too far behind.
IV. THERE IS NO LOSING FOR WINNING
This essay has suggested the ways in which Mansfield's efforts to reproduce an originalist and gendered constitutionalism produce, instead, an
aggregation of inversions. These inversions draw on a number of original
sources of American constitutionalism, but more importantly, on the gendered hierarchy of values and its expression as political doctrine. This essay engaged these efforts through a close reading of Mansfield’s development of a constitutionally sanctioned proposal of a President with legitimate
extra-legal authority. It suggested that Mansfield’s reading of law and
presidential power is couched not only in gendered terms but in irony as
well—the disciplining of manliness through inversion is an odd thing indeed. There is both audacity and inversion in the understanding of the
American Constitutional system Mansfield proposes. His reading is more
consonant with Francis Bacon’s understanding of Stewart absolutism within
182
a customary law society, than it is with popular constitutional understanding in the United States in the 21st century. On the other hand, to the extent
that it does reflect an underlying valid, though currently unpopular, reading
of the possibilities of American constitutionalism—if it is instead an early
assertion of a coming reality—then it suggests a move to a conception of
constitutional governance largely abandoned here for a long time. Perhaps
178 See Mansfield, supra note 9 (“[Y]et the rule of law is not enough to run a government . . . In
the Constitution executive power represents necessity . . . it anticipates what we cannot anticipate.”).
179 Id.
180 See generally MANSFIELD, supra note 32 (suggesting that female is generally nonaggressive,
docile, and risk averse).
181 See generally ARISTOTLE, supra note 24 (asserting that the male, by nature, is to rule the female).
182 See FRANCIS BACON, Essay No. 56, in ESSAYS AND NEW ATLANTIS 221 (1942) (1612).
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Mansfield is right, the United States is moving towards a neo-medievalism
in its political organization—which, it had been thought, the Founding gen183
eration sought to avoid. A gendered analysis of this framework analysis
helps expose both its character and consequences.
And yet, even if Mansfield’s extra-legal constitutionalism is misplaced
in historical context—and two hundred years of male dominated American
184
jurisprudence suggests that it is —the gendered legal order still survives
intact. Theory merely reverts to the traditional binary which genders ruleof-law as male, and the domestic portion of the private sphere female, and
thus extra-legal. Law is supposed to be rational, objective, abstract, and
principled, like men; it is not supposed to be irrational, subjective or per185
And, thus, is exposed the ultimate inversion of
sonalized, like women.
Mansfield’s formulation of extra-legal constitutionalism—the idea of unregulated space; extra-legal space is traditionally gendered male, when in
fact it forms, as feminist theory has long understood, the core of “unregulated space” gendered female (and consciously unregulated because it does
186
not merit the attention of positivist state theory or post-Dicey constitu187
tionalist theory).
Either way, the unitary executive theory, now in its current form al188
most a century old, has assumed a more medieval caste in the hands of
Harvey Mansfield. I have suggested that, like Francis Bacon before him,
189
extolling the extra constitutional power of the Stuart Monarchs, Harvey
Mansfield serves well an executive seeking to distinguish the executive
office, in form and in kind, from the more consensus based, domestic and
inward looking branches of government. The implications, from the perspective of hierarchy and subordination, extend well beyond institutional
190
theory. Mansfield represents an urge to neo-medievalism that is becom183 See generally Larry Catá Backer, Reifying Law: Government, Law and the Rule of Law in
Governance Systems, 26 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 521 (2008).
184 See Backer, supra note 2.
185 See, e.g., Frances E. Olsen, Feminism and Critical Legal Theory: An American Perspective, 18
INT’L J. SOC’Y L. 199, 201 (1990).
186 See generally JOHN AUSTIN, LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE: OR THE PHILOSOPHY OF POSITIVE
LAW (Robert Campbell ed., Gaunt 1998) (1879).
187 See generally A.V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
(Liberty Classics 1982) (1915).
188 See Calabresi & Rhodes, supra note 61.
189 See BACON, supra note 34, at 221.
190 See Jennifer C. Nash, Bearing Witness To Ghosts: Notes On Theorizing Pornography, Race,
And Law, 21 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 47, 48 (2006)(“In the service of exposing the continued ‘seething
presence’ of white dominance on the workings of feminist legal theory, it is critical to cast sustained
theoretical attention to sites that feminists have analyzed as solely gendered.”). Jennifer Nash’s insight,
focusing on the intersections of gender and race, has an application in the construction of the apparatus
of state, and theories of its legitimacy. I note, though, that the focus on whiteness in the context of state
building is over-narrow. As I have sought to demonstrate, race may determine the form of patriarchal
subordination, but does not suggest an absence of subordination. See generally Larry Catá Backer,
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ing increasingly fashionable among those elements of the American elite
who are no longer happy with the dominant Enlightenment foundationalism
of the Republic.

Emasculated Men, Effeminate Law in the United States, Zimbabwe and Malaysia, 17 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 1 (2005). A richer analysis would focus on the ways in which race and gender conflate in
different expressions of hierarchies, as one moves from the “germinal” context—white male dominated
states, to those in which non-white, non-Christian, male elites have been constituted. Neither the urge to
subordination, patriarchy, or gender hierarchies is a unique feature of whiteness, nor of the West; all are
intertwined with the West in shifting and peculiar ways. See generally Maxine Baca Zinn & Bonnie
Thornton Dill, Theorizing Difference from Multiracial Feminism, in FEMINIST THEORY READER: LOCAL
AND GLOBAL PERSPECTIVES 353-59 (Carole R. McCann & Seung-Kyung Kim eds., 2003).

